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The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato’s
Menexenus
Franco V. Trivigno

In Plato’s Menexenus, Socrates spends nearly the entire dialogue reciting
an epitaphios logos, or funeral oration, that he claims was taught to him by
Aspasia, Pericles’ mistress. Three diﬃculties confront the interpreter of this
dialogue. First, commentators have puzzled over how to understand the
intention of Socrates’ funeral oration (see Clavaud 1980, 17–77).1 Some insist
that it is parodic, performing an essentially critical function (e.g., Loraux
1986); while others claim that it is serious, in particular as an expression of
Plato’s political ideal (e.g., Kahn 1963).2 Adherents on both sides seem to
think that the options are mutually exclusive.3 Second, commentators have
had diﬃculty understanding why Plato would have Socrates attribute his
entire oration to Aspasia (e.g., Coventry 1989, 3; Pownall 2004, 60). Most
agree that this move is ironic and that it has something to do with the alleged
target of the dialogue’s criticism. But scholars have diﬀered over whether the
Aspasia reference is meant to implicate Pericles’ funeral oration (Monoson
1998), rhetoric in general (Pownall 2004), Athens (Loraux 1986), or even
Aeschines (Clavaud 1980).4 Third, scholars have struggled to make sense of
the dialogue’s “deliberate and fantastic anachronism” (Dodds 1990, 24). In
the funeral oration, Socrates relates the history of Athens up to the King’s
Peace in 386 b.c., a full thirteen years after he has died. This problem has
generated the least consensus, with some scholars restricting their analysis
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to dating considerations (e.g., Dodds 1990) and at least one speculating that
Socrates speaks in this dialogue as a ghost (Rosenstock 1994).5
It is the contention of this article that, by understanding the rhetoric of
parody in the Menexenus, one can resolve these diﬃculties and come to a
coherent and uniﬁed understanding of the philosophical intentions of the
dialogue.6 More speciﬁcally, I will show that the anachronism is a consequence of a particular parodic strategy, that of ampliﬁcation; that the
dialogue’s parody targets not only Pericles’ funeral oration in particular but
funeral oratory, rhetoric, and Athens as well; and that the parody has serious
philosophical implications.7 Further, I claim that the serious philosophical
content is both critical and constructive. Plato subverts the civic identity
and understanding of virtue encouraged by the genre of funeral oration,
and he challenges its praise-based model of political discourse. At the same
time, Plato’s parodic criticism is not entirely negative, for it relies on alternative paradigms of civic identity, virtue, and political discourse.

i. the rhetoric of parody
Before turning to the Menexenus itself, I want to clarify what I mean by
parody. For a working deﬁnition, I suggest that parody is “an imitation that
distorts a target text, author, or genre.”8 In order to make some general
observations about the rhetoric of parody, I will look brieﬂy at an exemplar
of parody from Aristophanes’ Frogs. I do so for three reasons: to display two
strategies of parodic distortion, to show that parody can have multiple targets,
and to argue that parody can have both serious and complex intentions.9
In the Frogs (1331–63), Aristophanes uses at least two techniques of
parodic distortion, inversion and ampliﬁcation, in his extended parody of
Euripides’ monodies or single-actor odes.10 Parodic inversion, broadly
speaking, upsets or overturns the target text by distorting the original in a
way that reverses the stylistic eﬀect or semantic intention. Parodic ampliﬁcation hones in on one aspect of the target text and ampliﬁes it to absurdity,
often exposing its artiﬁciality as a literary trope.
The parodic scene features a woman who awakens, hysterical and terriﬁed, from a god-sent dream, which has conveyed disturbing news. We ﬁnd
in this passage a particular kind of parodic inversion: bathos, the unexpected
introduction of the vulgar, ordinary, or mundane, which undermines an
otherwise somber tone.11 Consider the following excerpt:
Attendants, set alight a lamp for me,
Collect the dew of rivers in pitchers
30

P&R 42-1_02.indd 30

12/11/08 12:17:58 PM

the rhetoric of parody in plato’s menexenus

And heat the water,
So that I may wash away the god-sent dream.
Oh god of the sea,
It’s happened! Oh fellow dwellers,
Behold these portents! My rooster—
Snatched from me by Glyce long gone. (Frogs 1338–45)12
The parody accesses its target by mimicking several linguistic features
typical of tragic lyric (poetic diction, suppression of articles, etc.), thereby
reproducing a tragic tone.13 This tone is then undermined by bathos: the
protagonist’s terrifying prophetic dream turns out to be about nothing more
than a lost chicken. The parody targets features of tragic lyric that are not
necessarily peculiar to Euripides, though he is obviously the target as well.
In other words, the parody targets both Euripides and tragedy as such.
Parody’s distortion also works by amplifying an idiom or trope to
absurdity. The parodic passage targets the hysterical or frenzied repetition
of words typical of Euripidean monody.14 Notice the multiple repetitions
accumulated in ﬁve lines of the Aristophanic parody:
He soared soared [a)ne/ptat' a)ne/ptat'] into the ether
On the lightest tips of his wings,
Leaving pain pain [aÃxe' aÃxea] for me
And tears tears [da/krua da/krua] from my eyes
I shed shed [eÃbalon eÃbalon], feeling wretched. (Frogs 1351–55)
The repetitions occur in a way that is recognizably Euripidean but in such
close proximity as to make them seem artiﬁcial. The overaccumulation of
frantic repetition undermines its rhetorical intent because the repetition
occurs too frequently, and the degree to which it is a contrived literary trope
is exposed.
Aristophanes’ Frogs serves as an object lesson with respect to the
serious and complex intentions of parody.15 Parody expresses a kind of criticism, and while this criticism could be tongue in cheek, it might also have
a serious purpose. Hence, it would be a mistake to insist that no parody
has serious intentions.16 The parody of Euripides deals with a serious, that
is, important, issue, the relation between the decline of tragedy and the
decline of Athenian prominence (Henderson 2002, 5). Dionysus, the main
character, descends into Hades, where Euripides and Aeschylus compete
to become the savior of Athens. In addition to this serious context, the
parody exempliﬁes a serious and particular criticism of Euripides’ poetry.
31
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In order to understand the parody, we need to locate the determinate
axis of criticism, that is, the wherein or with respect to what the parodying
text is critical.17 In the ﬁrst quotation above, the parodic criticism is that
Euripides’ tragedy is too concerned with the everyday.18 By dramatizing an
ordinary situation in a high tragic manner, the parody absurdly exempliﬁes
Euripides’ earlier claim—a boast really—that his tragedies are concerned
with everyday matters, oi)kei=a pra/gmata (Frogs 959). This criticism of
Euripides as too mundane or ordinary is conﬁrmed at the end of the Frogs
when he is accused of “stripping the tragic art of its greatness” (1495–96).19
The criticism does not stand alone, however; it rather depends on a certain
paradigm or ideal of tragedy.
To see this, we need to turn to the complex intentions of parody, that
is, the way that parody can be both critical and constructive.20 Parody can
criticize while at the same time pointing beyond itself to an implied ideal,
which the parodied text fails to live up to. The Frogs is incoherent without
the assumption that tragedy has a privileged didactic role to play in the
city.21 The question that drives the action is whether Euripides or Aeschylus
better fulﬁlls the tragedian’s role as educator or, put diﬀerently, which tragedian remains true to the tragic ideal as Aristophanic comedy conceives of it.
If this is right, then based on the parodic criticism of Euripides, we might
conclude that the Aristophanic ideal of tragedy includes the portrayal of
great, exemplary ﬁgures. One way that tragedy performs its educational
function is by staging characters “better than ourselves,” as Aristotle puts it
(Poet. 1448a16–18), as paradigms or exemplars.22 But by staging an ordinary
situation with an ordinary character, so the parodic criticism goes, this is
just what Euripides fails to do.
Armed with this understanding of the possibilities of the rhetoric
of parody, that is, its techniques, its multiple targets, and its serious and
complex intentions, I now turn to the Menexenus.

ii. ironic praise and comedy in the opening scene
In the opening scene of the Menexenus, Plato prepares us for the parody by
introducing its multiple targets through ironic praise and by establishing a
comic tone. First, on hearing that Menexenus is coming from the Council
Chamber, Socrates teases him by suggesting that the young man is “ﬁnished
with education and philosophy” and ready to turn to the “higher pursuit” of
holding political oﬃce in Athens (234a4–7). Socrates’ praise of participation
in Athenian politics is clearly ironic here, as there is arguably never a time
32
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when one is done with philosophy and no sense in which holding public
oﬃce in Athens constitutes a higher pursuit than philosophy.
When Menexenus clariﬁes that he has only been to the Council
Chamber to hear the choice of speaker for the upcoming funeral oration,
Socrates launches into a speech ironically extolling the virtues of funeral
oratory. Socrates lauds death in war as especially fortunate, since one gets
an expensive funeral and lavish praise from an expert orator, even if one was
not particularly distinguished in battle. Not only are all the dead praised,
but the audience is typically praised as well.23 As Socrates puts it, the funeral
orator “cast[s] a spell over . . . the souls” of the audience by praising the city,
the war dead, the city’s ancestors, and the living citizens; under this spell,
Socrates claims to feel “taller and nobler and more beautiful all of a sudden,” and he imagines that Athens is the Islands of the Blessed; only after
several days does this bewitching eﬀect wear oﬀ (234c–235c).24
Menexenus immediately recognizes Socrates’ praise as ironic and
accuses him of implicitly mocking and criticizing the orators in general
(235c6). He worries that the speaker they choose will have insuﬃcient
time to compose the speech. Mentioning the short time between selection and speech was one of the commonplaces of the funeral oration.
Here, Socrates’ criticism becomes explicit. He asserts that epitaphioi are
all prepared ahead of time, strongly implying that they are formulaic. In
addition, he claims that they are destined to succeed, since “when one
performs in front of the very people one is praising, it is no great accomplishment to seem to speak well” (235d5–6).25 This ironic praise of funeral
oratory and rhetoric anticipates some of the substance of the parodic criticism to follow.
Socrates praises Aspasia as his formidable rhetoric teacher and Pericles, “the one exceptional orator among the Greeks,” as her best student
(235e6–7). Aspasia was Pericles’ mistress and a favorite target of the comedians (Henry 1995, 19–28).26 Socrates credits his epitaphios to her: she recited
it “in part extemporaneously, in part by cobbling together [sugkollw=sa]
some remnants from when she was composing the funeral oration Pericles
delivered” (236b3–6).27 By claiming the much-maligned Aspasia as his
rhetoric teacher and attributing a funeral oration to her, he implicitly
denigrates both rhetoric and funeral oratory.28 Further, by insisting on
attributing to her both Pericles’ rhetorical education and his funeral oration, Socrates makes clear that Pericles’ funeral oration is also one of his
targets.29 Even Menexenus understands Socrates’ irony in attributing the
speech to Aspasia (236c5–7).30
33
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Socrates’ ironic claim that even someone less well educated than himself
could succeed in praising Athenians in front of Athenians seems to indicate
that the parody targets the Periclean funeral oration as Thucydides presented
it. He cites the example of “a man who was taught music by Lamprus and
oratory by Antiphon the Rhamnusian” (236a). This is arguably a reference
to Thucydides. Marcellinus, impressed with Thucydides’ praise of Antiphon
and their similar prose style, had speculated that Antiphon was Thucydides’
teacher (Vit. Thuc. 22).31 In addition, Socrates uses Thucydidean language
in the prologue: he twice refers to the Spartans as “Peloponnesians” (235d3,
235d4), a term that Thucydides uses frequently and Plato, almost never. In
other dialogues, Plato uses “Lacadaimonians” almost exclusively.32
In addition to these ironic hints as to the target of the parody, Plato
includes some topoi from Old Comedy, which signal that the funeral speech
is parodic. Socrates plays the comic ﬁgure of the late learner, whose old
age and attendant forgetfulness make his enrollment in school ridiculous.33
He hesitates to give the speech because he is afraid that Menexenus will
laugh at him since, though he is such an old man, he will be playing with
epitaphios. In addition, Socrates portrays Aspasia as a tyrant, who nearly
beat him for not remembering her speech well enough, and he fears that
she will be very angry with him for revealing it. Socrates ﬁnally commits to
performing the speech for Menexenus, whom he so greatly wishes to gratify
that he would willingly strip and dance for him (236c11–d2). This declaration recalls the practice of the chorus in Old Comedy, which always cast oﬀ
their cloaks before dancing and sometimes announced that they were doing
so.34 The playfulness of the opening scene prepares us for the parody—but,
as many commentators have noticed, the playful tone of the prologue does
not carry over into the epitaphios itself (e.g., Kennedy 1963, 159).35

iii. plato’s parody of pericles
Socrates’ speech contains all of the conventional elements of the epitaphios:
a prelude (prooemium) identifying the speech as required by law, praise
(epainos) of the dead and of the city’s past glory, a consoling exhortation
(paramythia) to the relatives of the dead, and an epilogue concluding
the speech and dismissing the audience (Ziolkowski 1981).36 However,
there are also more particular reminiscences of the Periclean oration
(Gomme 1956; Henderson 1975; Kahn 1963; Monoson 1998).37 Though the
two speeches are bound by the same conventions, in two instances Plato
seems clearly to be parodying Pericles (Kahn 1963, 222).38
34
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The prelude typically consisted of a reference to the nomos prescribing
the speech, reﬂection on the proper kind of logos, and some preliminary
praise, which marked a transition to the next section (Ziolkowski 1981,
58–73). The logos–ergon antithesis was a commonplace in the prelude to
denote the diﬃculty of ﬁnding the words to do justice to the brave deeds of
the fallen (Ziolkowski 1981, 68–70). Both Pericles and Socrates begin their
speeches with a more elaborate version of this antithesis:
Many of those [oi( me\n polloi\] who have spoken here in the past
have praised the man who set down the custom [t%= no/m%] of this
speech [to\n lo/gon to/nde], deeming it good that it should be delivered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For my part [e)moi\ de\],
it seems that the worth that had displayed itself in deeds [eãrg%]
should be suﬃciently rewarded by honors also shown by deeds
[eãrg%], such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s
cost, and not have the valor [a)reta\j] of many men imperiled by
one man, to stand or fall according to whether he spoke well or
poorly. (Thuc. 2.35.1)
As for deeds [eãrg% me\n], these man have received their due from
us, and with it they travel on their destined path, accompanied
communally by the city and privately by their families. As for
words [lo/g% me\n], the remaining honor, which the custom
[no/moj] assigns for these men and duty demands, must be bestowed.
When deeds [eãrgwn] have been bravely done, it is through
beautifully spoken words [lo/g%] that commemoration and honor
accrue for the doers from the audience. What is required, then,
is a speech [lo/gou] that suﬃciently praises those who have died.
(Mx. 236d7–e1)
Kahn persuasively argues that the respective antitheses are too particular
to be coincidental: “In both cases the logos in question is, of course, the
funeral oration; and in both cases, the contrasting eãrg% is used twice: ﬁrst
for the ceremonious act of public burial and, secondly, for the brave deeds of
the dead warriors” (1963, 222).39 No other oration contains such an elaborate
antithesis, and no other refers to the act of burial as one of the “deeds” to be
contrasted with the funeral speech.40
Though he uses the same terms (logos, ergon, nomos) and syntactical
construction (antithesis) as Pericles in order to introduce his task, Socrates
makes the opposite point. Whereas Pericles laments the necessity of words
35
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in order to make deeds praiseworthy and regrets the custom that makes his
speech necessary at all, Socrates emphatically endorses the custom and the
necessity of beautiful words.41 Socrates reminds one of Pericles’ antithesis
but inverts or overturns the meaning. This inversion operates on two levels
because both Pericles and Socrates are (to some degree) dissembling: we
might call Pericles’ rhetorical ﬁgure a kind of false modesty, an aﬀected or
feigned self-deprecation. In overtly denying the wisdom of the tradition
and the importance of his role as executor, Pericles actually means to aﬃrm
it, and by not doing what everyone else does, he draws attention to himself
as a unique speaker. Socrates turns this ﬁgure on its head—in ironically
praising the custom and exalting himself as its executor, he actually undermines both the speech’s and the speaker’s importance.
Thus, Socrates implicitly challenges the tradition and announces a
“polemical relationship” with Pericles (Kahn 1963, 222).42 He implies that the
beautiful but false words are necessary, since the truth would be ill suited to
the event’s purpose: as Socrates points out earlier, not all of the deeds were
brave or praiseworthy (234c2–6). The words will not match but, rather, exceed
the deeds, though the tradition has it the other way around. The implicit ideal is
that words should be appropriate to deeds: beautiful words should be reserved
for truly admirable deeds. Pericles and other funeral orators praise the deeds
of the war dead with beautiful words whether they deserve it or not.
In the praise section of the epitaphios, it was common to praise the
constitution, or politei/a, of Athens (Ziolkowski 1981, 89–91, 95).43 The
speech’s second clear parallel to Pericles’ oration comes in Socrates’ manner
of praising the city’s democratic constitution:
In name, [our constitution] is called a democracy [dhmokrati¯a
ke/klhtai], because we govern not for the few but for the many;
whereas equality in the eyes of the law exists for all in their
private disputes, with respect to social standing [kata\ de\ th\n
a)ci/wsin], each person is honored with public oﬃce for his good
reputation [eãn t% eu)dokimei=]—not by class but rather by virtue
[a)p' a)reth=j]—and nor again if he is poor but capable of doing
some good for the city will he be prevented on account of insufﬁcient public esteem. (Thuc. 2.37.1–2)
Though one man calls [kalei=] our constitution a democracy
[dhmokrati/an], and another, whatever pleases him, in truth, it is an
aristocracy with the people’s approval. We have always had kings.

36
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At one time, they were by birth; at another time, they were elected.
But for the most part, the people possess power over the city, and
they grant government oﬃces and powers to those who at any
given time seem to be the best [toi=j a)ei\ do/casin a)ri/stoij eiÅnai].
No one is excluded because of poverty or weakness or obscure
parentage—nor is anyone honored because of the opposites, as in
other cities—but there is one standard: the one who seems wise
or good [o( do/caj sofo\j hÄ a)gaqo\j eiÅnai] has power and governs.
(Mx. 238c7–d8)
Both emphasize that the leaders are chosen based on their reputation for
virtue. What Pericles implies, that the constitution is not really a democracy, Socrates comes right out and says by calling it an aristocracy.44 When
Thucydides describes the state of Athens during Pericles’ heyday, he claims
that it was in practice not a democracy: “While in speech the city was a
democracy, in fact, it was ruled by a ﬁrst citizen” (2.65.10).
In his praise of the Athenian constitution, Socrates ampliﬁes the
necessity of seeming or appearing wise in order to rule in the city. The
necessity of appearing is implicit in the Periclean formulation: the second
antithesis concerns the evaluation, the deeming worthy, which is granted
according to reputation or esteem (t% eu)dokimei= ). When describing the
public choice or preference, the reference to reputation, the implication of
seeming, falls away, and the choice is described as being made according to
virtue (a)p' a)reth=j). For Pericles, the implication is that seeming virtuous
is, or must be, an indication of virtue. Socrates exposes this not only by
leaving the implication of seeming intact in his reformulation but by making it so explicit as to give pause.45 The “heaviness” of the two clauses, toi=j
a)ei\ do/casin a)ri/stoij eiÅnai and o( do/caj sofo\j hÄ a)gaqo\j eiÅnai, focuses
our attention on the importance of seeming. Through this ampliﬁcation,
Socrates suggests that seeming wise—having a reputation for wisdom—is
not a suﬃcient condition of being wise.
The implication of the parody is that, in a democracy, one never gets
outside of the appearance of virtue to the reality of the matter. Thus, Socrates
undermines the supposedly meritocratic basis of democratic political power.
Socrates’ parodic criticism targets Pericles both as speaker, by undermining
his assertion, and as leader of Athens, by undermining his claim to be virtuous and thus deserving of rule.46 Ideally, of course, the best, or the virtuous,
should rule. That they do not in Athens is not an incidental feature of the
democracy. Rather, it follows from democracy’s emphasis on appearances

37
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and the attendant importance of rhetoric that the most persuasive speaker
will rule instead.47

iv. the distortion of athenian history in the
funeral oration
The praise section typically contained a historical part, which celebrated
the noble deeds of the ancestors of the dead (Ziolkowski 1981, 90, 95–97).
After giving an account of the city’s autochthonous origin, Socrates uses
the Persian War as a paradigm to paint a portrait of Athens—in line
with the tradition of funeral oratory—as a philanthropic city that ﬁghts
for the freedom of the Greeks against barbarian aggression.48 The genre
requires the history to reﬂect Athenian moral and military superiority. To
achieve this, Socrates’ funeral oration incorporates numerous historical
inaccuracies.49 However, since fourth-century orators and funeral speakers in particular regularly misrepresented Athenian history (Pearson 1941;
Perlman 1961; Pownall 2004, 38–40; Samons 2000, 96; Worthington 1994),
often for the greater glory of Athens, we cannot conclude from the mere
presence of historical inaccuracies, or of any particular inaccuracy, that
Socrates’ speech contains parodic distortion.50 The parodic distortion lies
rather in the accumulation of such inaccuracies that render the history it
presents both self-contradictory in places and on the whole unbelievable.51
Thus, Socrates adopts the logic of patriotic, revisionist history and ampliﬁes the revisions to absurdity.52 In this way, Plato exposes the deceptive and
self-aggrandizing character of the history section as a whole. I will focus my
analysis on three distortions: ﬁrst, Socrates omits mention of Athens’ ﬁfthcentury empire; second, he claims that Athens has never been defeated; last,
he insists that Athens is always hostile to Persia.
To sanitize the character of Athens’ ﬁfth-century empire, or to ignore
it altogether, was common in fourth-century oratory (Chambers 1975;
Pownall 2004, 41–43). To maintain Athens’ moral superiority, Socrates’
speech sacriﬁces a signiﬁcant achievement of Athens’ military superiority,
her empire. To acknowledge that Athens was an empire would confound
the Persian War model, by casting the heroic liberators as enslavers.53 On
Socrates’ account, Athens only ﬁghts just, defensive wars. Battles from the
ﬁfth century seeming to relate to the establishment, expansion, and defense
of Athens’ empire are all interpreted as either strictly defensive or aiming at the liberation of an oppressed city. On Socrates’ account, the initial
hostilities with the Spartans resulted from Athens’ desire to ﬁght “for the
38

P&R 42-1_02.indd 38

12/11/08 12:18:01 PM

the rhetoric of parody in plato’s menexenus

freedom of the Boeotians” (242a7), as the Athenians took up their new role
of “ﬁghting for the freedom of Greeks against other Greeks” (242b5–6);
the Archidamian War (the ﬁrst half of the Peloponnesian War) was fought
because “all the Greeks attacked” Athens (242c3–5); the Sicilian expedition
was undertaken in order to achieve the “freedom of the people of Leontini”
(243a1–2). These descriptions are clearly self-serving, not to mention selfaggrandizing, accounts of the origins of each of the conﬂicts.54 It is arguably the case that these battles resulted from Athens’ aggressive imperialist
policy, as advocated by Pericles (Thuc. 2.36) and later leaders like Alcibiades
(Thuc. 6.16–18).55 Socrates’ silence on the topic of empire contrasts most
strongly with Pericles’ emphatic assertion that the expansion of the empire
measures the achievement of a generation (Thuc. 2.36.1–3).56 By remaining
silent on the ﬁfth-century empire, Socrates’ speech challenges Pericles’ ideal
of an expansive empire and, with that, the need for wars of aggression.
The Athenian funeral oration, to be sure, emphasized Athenian superiority in warfare and cited its numerous victories, the Persian War most
prominently (Ziolkowski 1981, 121–29). Though other orators at least concede
Athens’ defeats, even if they understandably do not dwell on them, Socrates
insists that Athens “remains undefeated to this day” (243d5–6).57 He claims
that the people who thought that the city could never be defeated were
right to believe it! Socrates qualiﬁes this statement by clarifying that Athens
was never defeated by others—she only defeated herself. Though his account
forces Socrates to insist that every single defeat was an instance of selfdefeat, he refuses to criticize the Athenians for their quarrels and disunity.58
By contrast, he is at pains to emphasize their “kinship” and “steady friendship” (244a2)—even in the bitter civil war of 403 b.c. —and their avoidance
of “malice” and “hatred” (244a7). Socrates claims also that, through bravery,
Athens won not only the naval battle at Arginusae but also “the rest of the
[Peloponnesian] war as well” (243d2)! Since military and moral inferiority are
ruled out, any failure is due to “bad luck” (244b1), and Socrates uses ambiguous and distancing language to describe such occurrences.59 By pausing to
dwell on the question of defeat and taking such circumlocutory pains to
avoid its admission, Socrates undermines his attempt to gloss over it.60
Socrates’ insistence that the Athenians remain resolutely hostile to
the Persians falls into obvious contradiction when imposed on the Corinthian conﬂict. Indeed, Socrates draws attention to the inconsistency by
ratcheting up the anti-Persian rhetoric: he claims that the Athenians “by
nature hate the barbarians” (245c7–d1), “are purely Greek, not mixed with
barbarians” (245d1–2), and have an “uncompromising hatred of foreign
39
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origin” (245d5–6). Socrates declares that, though against fellow Greeks “it is
right to ﬁght until victory,” against the barbarians “it is right to ﬁght until
destruction” (242d1–4). The Persian king is described as the “worst enemy”
of all the Greeks (243b). Other Greek cities are excoriated for conspiring
with the Persians, as though this were a severe moral failing (243b, 244b–c).
In response to such commiseration, the indignant Athenians adopted a
policy of “no longer protecting the Greeks from being enslaved” (244c3–5).
When the Spartans began to enslave Greeks and Persians alike, Socrates
claims, “even the King was in such diﬃculties that his liberation came from
none other than that city which he had been so eager to destroy” (244d5–e1).
Socrates immediately oﬀers an excuse for helping Persia followed by a disingenuous qualiﬁcation. For helping the Persians, Athens can be “justly
charged” with being “always excessively prone to pity and attentive to the
weak” (244e1–3). She could not bear to assist the king in person, so she
“released the Greeks from slavery herself ” but let “exiles and mercenaries”
help the Persians (245a1–7). The speciousness of this qualiﬁcation becomes
apparent when Socrates insists that Athens “saved” the king (245a7) and
praises “those who released the king” as brave (246a1). These latter must
be Athenians, since the praise comes in the context of the bravery of the
Athenians lost in the Corinthian conﬂict.
One might want to object here that the history that Socrates presents does not really amplify—or amplify enough—the level of historical
inaccuracy typical of fourth-century orators to justify calling it parody. The
dialogue’s “deliberate and fantastic” anachronism, which becomes clear in
the history section, I suggest, caps the parodic strategy of ampliﬁcation to
absurdity and ensures the parodic intentions of Socrates’ account. Though
anachronism is not unknown in Plato, the anachronism in the Menexenus
is unique, not only because the dramatic date is so obviously impossible but
also because Socrates explicitly calls attention to it. He begins by implying
that he will not dwell on the Corinthian conﬂict since it is contemporary
(244d1–3) but then proceeds to give a long and detailed account of it. By
dramatically pausing at the moment he begins the contemporary part of
his history, he calls attention to himself as speaker and the essential unreliability of his account. Further, it seems very unlikely that, given the nature
of his trial and execution and indeed what he says about the Athenians in
Apology and elsewhere, Socrates would actually endorse as true his glowing
portrait of Athens and Athenian history. Thus, like the circumlocutions and
inconsistencies, the anachronism draws our attention to the dubious nature
of the history that the oration presents.61
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Socrates, in presenting a contradictory history, and indeed a history
that it is a contradiction for him to have given, goes beyond the acceptable
level of revisionist history expected of the genre. The parody makes two
main points about the funeral oration’s historical inaccuracies. First, by
following the epitaphios’s logic of praise to absurdity, Socrates exposes its
utter lack of concern for truth. The bewitching feeling of self-satisfaction,
which Socrates describes in the opening, depends on deception. By making
the audience feel good when being deceived, the funeral oration fosters
an indiﬀerence to truth. Good political rhetoric, by contrast, would foster
a desire for the truth. Second, by revealing the distance between a praiseworthy Athenian history and the actual Athenian history, Socrates’ parody
rejects Athens’ imperial past while at the same time encouraging a peaceful,
or at least nonaggressive, future.

v. the exhortation to virtue in the speech
of the dead
A regular feature of the epitaphios was the exhortation section, which
typically contained both consolation and advice (Ziolkowski 1981, 138–63,
esp. 138–40). Those who argue that the funeral oration is meant seriously or
nonparodically typically point to this section (246d–249c), the bulk of which
consists of a speech that Socrates delivers about virtue on behalf of the dead
(246d–248d). They do so based on two considerations: ﬁrst, the exhortation to virtue looks like a Socratic exhortation (Kahn 1963);62 second, there
is a noticeable shift in tone at the beginning of the exhortation section
(Collins and Stauﬀer 1999, 91, 104–9; Henderson 1975, 45; Monoson 1998,
502; Rosenstock 1994, 340; Salkever 1993, 140).63 Neither consideration is
decisive: commentators have not fully appreciated, ﬁrst, that the exhortation was a regular feature of the genre and, second, that a shift in tone is just
what one would expect when moving from celebration and praise to consolation and exhortation.64 On my view, the speech of the dead continues
the parody through its subtle inversion of the impoverished and militaristic
conception of virtue, or aretē, typical of the funeral oration.65
It would hardly be an exaggeration to claim that virtue is a central
theme of epitaphios.66 The funeral oration sets up a paradigm or model
of virtue for the citizens. In the Socratic parody, aretē, as in other funeral
orations, primarily means “courage” or “valor.” This is unsurprising in a
speech that praises the war dead. In the beginning of the oration, Socrates
claims that the two requirements of an epitaphios are to praise the dead
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as they deserve and to admonish the living by urging them to imitate the
aretē of the dead (236e3–6). Throughout the epitaphios, aretē simply means
“courage.” During the speech of the dead, however, a paradigm shift occurs
in the understanding of aretē that is subtle but signiﬁcant.
Socrates ends the praise section, recalling his own elenchic practice as
described in the Apology 29d–30b, by encouraging the sons of the dead to
be brave and claiming that “whenever I happen to meet any one of you,
I will remind and exhort you [parakeleu/esqai] to strive to be as good as
possible [w(j a)ri/stouj] ” (246b7–c2). Socrates claims that he will repeat the
words of the dead that he “heard from them and what . . . they would gladly
say to [the living] now, if they were able” (246c4–5). The speech exhorts
three distinct groups: the sons of the dead (246d–247c), the parents of the
dead (247c–248d), and, very brieﬂy, the city (248d).67
The ﬁrst injunction to the sons is to act always “with aretē, knowing that, without it, all possessions and ways of life are shameful and bad”
(246e1–2). Up until this point, aretē has been used to indicate bravery, that
is, virtue in warfare, exclusively. Given the reference to “ways of life” in this
instance, however, a wider conception of aretē is clearly in play. This reading is conﬁrmed by the very next instance: “All knowledge cut oﬀ from
justice and the rest of virtue [th=j aãllhj a)reth=j] looks like cunning, not
wisdom” (246e7–247a2). This claim has been taken as an “allusion” to the
unity of the virtues (Kahn 1963, 229), but such an interpretation goes too
far. While the speech surely does endorse the unity of virtue in some sense,
it certainly does not do so in a genuinely Socratic way. This is conﬁrmed by
the rest of the exhortation to the children, which is concerned with honor,
possessions, and public esteem; in fact, it reverts to the militaristic notion
of virtue by conceiving it in terms of victory and defeat, glory and shame
(247a–c).
In the exhortation to the parents, Socrates mentions, indeed features,
the Delphic injunction to moderation: mhde\n aÃgan, or nothing in excess
(247e5). Once virtue ceases to be understood as identical to military
prowess, Socrates begins referring to the particular virtues (as opposed
to virtue as such), including a)ndrei=oj, the vox propria for courage, which
occurs only in the exhortation to the parents (247d7, 247d8, 248a4). Again,
some commentators have seen this endorsement of moderation as genuinely Socratic (e.g., Kahn 1963, 229). This is hardly so, as the moderation
encouraged primarily concerns the level of grief that the parents will allow
themselves to publicly express (248b–c). To be sure, such a sentiment looks
like the injunction against public expressions of grief in the Republic, but,
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by itself, it much more resembles the commonplace in the epitaphios of
acknowledging parental grief while at the same time denying its necessity
and enjoining the parents to moderate their expression of it (Ziolkowski
1981, 151–53).68 Further, Socrates talks as though moderation amounts to its
public face: “If [the fathers] give in to grief, they will elicit the suspicion that
either they are not really the fathers [of the dead] or the people who praise
[the dead] are wrong” (247e1–2). The emphasis here is on how one appears
and not, as one would expect from a genuinely Socratic account, on the
state of one’s soul.69
The parodic criticism reveals the understanding of virtue encouraged by
epitaphios to be overly narrow and indeed at the expense of the other virtues.
In showing this, he both reveals a limitation of the epitaphios’s conception
of virtue and points to a richer ideal of virtue. While it is not inappropriate
for a funeral oration to celebrate bravery in battle, the epitaphios inappropriately construes virtue as equivalent to military prowess. It restricts a
citizen’s understanding of his duties to his military duties and so circumscribes the measure of his ﬁtness or goodness as a person. For example,
according to Pericles, bravery in battle cancels out other vices (Thuc. 2.42).70
This myopic understanding of virtue goes hand in hand with an aggressive
military program and expansionist policies like those advocated by Pericles
and other leaders.71 If being good implies being a successful warrior, then
the city has an obligation to look for wars in order to give its citizens an
opportunity to demonstrate their worth. But this would preclude the pursuit of intellectual and more particularly philosophical goals. Further, such
a narrow conception aﬀects other virtues as well, by limiting their scope and
relevance. Virtue is indeed uniﬁed on this conception, but we need moderation, it seems, only when a soldier has bravely died. The critique does not
itself substantially ﬁll out the thicker notion of virtue, but it does expose the
inadequacy and attendant dangers of the narrow version.72
If this analysis is right, then Plato exploits the superﬁcial similarity
between Socratic exhortation and funeral oratory’s in order to expose the
latter as a poor version of the former. Though the ideas in the exhortation are not themselves genuinely Socratic, the parody points toward
a Socratic conception of virtue. While Socrates’ exhortation genuinely
attempts to turn its audience toward a philosophically grounded conception of virtue—indeed, the discovery of the philosophical ground is often
the entire point—epitaphios halfheartedly attempts to inculcate an already
given war-oriented demotic virtue. The force of this point is perhaps
clouded by taking the passage in isolation from the rest of the speech.73
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Notice that everything preceding the exhortation encourages the audience
to think that they already are virtuous, and so the attempt to convince them
to pursue virtue at this point in the epitaphios could hardly be expected to
succeed. By contrast, genuinely Socratic protreptic operates via criticism,
not praise.74 Further, while Socrates typically exhorts his interlocutors to
pursue an inquiry into the nature of virtue, the epitaphios presents a determinate conception of virtue for its audience to pursue. But to understand
the point of the parody is to see the inadequacies of the martial conception
of virtue and, ideally, to be moved to investigate the true nature of virtue.
This is the essence of Socratic protreptic, if anything is.75

vi. care, war, and the role of the city
Socrates ends the speech of the dead with a brief exhortation to the city to
care for the living: “We would exhort the city to care for [e)pimelh/sontai]
our parents and children, educating the latter decently and cherishing the
former in their old age as they deserve, but we already know that she will care
for [e)pimelh/setai] them suﬃciently without our exhortation” (248d2–6).
In describing what the city actually does, Socrates claims, “For those who
have died, she stands as an inheritor and a son, for their sons, as a father,
for their parents, as a guardian; she takes complete care [e)pime/leian] of all
of them for all time” (249b7–c3). Some scholars have taken this passage as a
serious, nonparodic expression of Plato’s political ideal in terms of care and,
recalling the Republic, family relationships (most notably, Monoson 1998).76
This interpretation fails to adequately appreciate, ﬁrst, that Socrates praises
Athens for already accomplishing such care and, second, that the model of
care is articulated in primarily military terms and takes no account of the
education of the soul. On my view, this passage completes the parody of the
tendency of epitaphios to idealize the actual city, with an emphasis on its
relationship to its citizen-soldiers.
Socrates’ insistence that Athens already provides adequate care to its citizens provides a strong presumption in favor of parodic intentions. While earlier
praise of Athens focused on her military achievements, here the parody focuses
on the city’s relation to its citizens. In enumerating the components of state
care, Socrates makes clear that the city’s concern kicks in only after someone
has died in battle (248e). There are three basic elements of this state care, which
do not, it seems to me, add up to a legitimately Platonic conception of care.
First, Socrates claims that the parents of the dead are protected from
injustice by the highest magistrate more than (diafero/ntwj) the other
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citizens (248e8–249a3). The unspoken implication seems to be that the
others are inadequately protected from injustice. Notice too that one is
protected from suﬀering injustice, not from becoming unjust. The latter,
a task for moral education, Socrates consistently argues is worse than the
former.77 Second, the city “takes on the role of father” to the orphaned
children and assists in raising them (249a). Again, the implication is that
the city does not normally do this, that is, it restricts such duties to the children of the war dead.78 When the orphans attain manhood, they are given
the “instruments of their fathers’ aretē,” and, dressed in hoplite armor, they
are oﬃcially recognized as full citizens and allowed to “rule their ancestral
hearth with strength, decked out in arms” (249a6–b2). This metaphor assimilates the family to an army, led by a citizen-warrior. This ritual transference
took place during the Great or City Dionysia, an international festival that
featured not only tragedy and comedy but also stark reminders of Athens’
imperial dominance. According to Isocrates, during this festival, the annual
tribute to Athens was collected from the allies and ceremoniously brought
onto the stage in front of a full theater (de Pace 82).79 The orphan ceremony
cannot be divorced from this military context: it symbolized the continuance and expansion of Athenian dominance. As the ﬁnal component of
state care, the city “never fails to honor the dead” through its yearly celebration of the funeral oration itself (249b3).80 If my analysis of Socrates’ funeral
oration as parodic is right, then its celebration can hardly count as genuine
care. In fact, as the parody has been implying all along, the funeral oration
is actually harmful to the souls of the citizens.
The model of care that Socrates articulates in this section, contra
Monoson, is hardly Platonic. By describing Athens as actually caring for its
citizens adequately, Socrates’ parody exposes her as remiss while at the same
time pointing toward an ideal in which the city actually would care for its
citizens in the relevant sense. The glaring omission in Socrates’ account is
moral education or care for the soul. Surely, any genuinely Platonic account
would feature care for the soul in a central role. The ﬁnal component of
state care, the funeral oration itself, surely does not accomplish such care.
Quite the opposite: as I will presently argue, the parody reveals the funeral
oration to be harmful in three main ways.

vi. plato’s ideal of political rhetoric
At the very end of the dialogue (249d–e), Socrates asks Menexenus if he is
grateful to Aspasia for her speech. The young man claims that he is grateful
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for the speech—whoever composed it—and asks Socrates to continue to
report such speeches to him. One wonders what Menexenus has taken from
the speech. He does not seem transported to the Islands of the Blessed,
but nor does he seem to get the critical point of Socrates’ parody. What
exactly is he supposed to get? In what follows, I turn to the task of bringing
together the criticisms and the implied ideals. In my view, the parodic criticism shows that funeral oratory encourages self-ignorant complacency, an
indiﬀerence to truth, and the pursuit of false goods. A political rhetoric that
genuinely cared for its audience would attempt to foster self-knowledge, an
orientation toward the truth and the pursuit of genuine goods, like wisdom
and virtue. Further, I try to show, albeit brieﬂy, how both Socrates and the
Menexenus itself attempt to live up to these ideals.
Plato’s critique of the genre of epitaphios is part of his critique of
“encomiastic discourse,” the discourse of praise in general (Nightingale
1993).81 Socrates claims that praising the dead and admonishing the living
to virtue are the central elements of the speech (236e), but, as his acerbic
remarks at the beginning of the dialogue show and as Pericles’ oration
most clearly exempliﬁes, the living in fact are praised for already having
virtue rather than prodded into acquiring it. This is why Socrates feels
“taller and nobler and more beautiful” after hearing a funeral oration. But
insofar as the funeral oration praises its audience, it actually harms them.
The citizens listening to an orator praising them will be deceived about
themselves. Indeed, when it is one’s own self-conception that is at stake, as
Socrates points out, the bewitching and deceptive eﬀect of the praise has
the greatest chance of success. The self-knowledge of the Athenian citizens is in greatest peril when they are praised. Made self-ignorant in this
way, they become complacent and lazy—exactly how Socrates describes
them in the Apology (30e). While epitaphios seemingly desires to encourage virtue, its praise wholly undermines this task by causing self-ignorance.
The alternative ideal of political discourse would actually encourage virtue
by occasioning genuine self-knowledge; to do so, it must engage in criticism. Indeed, both the rhetoric of Socrates, ironic praise, and that of Plato,
parodic criticism, set up counterideals to the epitaphios’s praise-based
model of political discourse in the Menexenus itself. By revealing through
criticism the deleterious eﬀects of praise, they both attempt to encourage
self-knowledge in their respective audiences, in this case, Menexenus and
Plato’s fourth-century Athenian readership.
The funeral oration’s lack of concern for truth is shown in the
indiscriminate praises it bestows on both the war dead and the audience
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members (Coventry 1989, 8). The audience’s ensuing feeling of superiority
rests on false premises with even further psychologically damaging eﬀects.
The logic of the funeral oration requires that the city and the war dead be
praised whether they deserve it or not (234c–235e). The rhetorical eﬀect of
the speech, making its listeners feel good about themselves, depends on this
distortion. The emphasis, as in democratic politics, falls on appearances, on
how things seem—as long as the orator makes Athens seem praiseworthy,
he has done his job well. This lack of concern for truth has a harmful eﬀect
on the psychic health of the listening audience. Because the funeral oration
prefers an attractive but false appearance, it fosters an indiﬀerence to truth
in the audience. By contrast, the ideal of political discourse would engender
in its audience an orientation toward the truth. Socrates and Plato, through
the critical exposure of the deceptive rhetoric of funeral oratory, attempt to
instill such a concern for truth in their respective audiences.
As we have seen, funeral oratory in general and Pericles’ oration in particular encourage a militaristic conception of virtue and civic identity. This
is because they are both indexed to the alleged good of military conquest. It
is not so much the ﬁgure of Pericles that is the concern of the parody but,
rather, the gloriﬁcation of aggressive imperialism in Athens’ civic ideal, to
which Pericles gives the clearest expression.82 The parodic oration’s silence
on the matter of the ﬁfth-century empire speaks volumes as a rejection of
the imperialist ideal. Its insistence on Athens’ defensive posture distorts the
history to absurdity and so implicitly suggests that aggressive military campaigns are not praiseworthy and that wars can only be justly waged when
made necessary by some outside force. This runs directly counter to Pericles’
insistence that the growth of the empire is the measure of a generation’s
success (Thuc. 2.36). By creating a ﬁctional history that rejects not only
the reality of the ﬁfth-century empire but its ideal as well, Socrates rejects
Pericles’ accomplishments both as a statesman and as an orator. According to the parodic critique, not only were Athens’ historical actions on the
whole not praiseworthy, but her aspiration to a Periclean ideal of aggressive
militarism was misguided as well. Those who listen to Pericles’ oration feel
taller and more beautiful for all the wrong reasons.
By exposing the glory of military conquest as a false good, Plato’s dialogue implies that political discourse should attempt to orient its audience
toward a genuine good, like wisdom or virtue. But neither wisdom nor
virtue can be transmitted through the medium of funeral oratory, which
dictates a determinate conception of virtue to a passive audience. The end
of Socrates’ oration, by contrast, does not end the dialogue—Menexenus
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is given an opportunity to respond, to think critically, and to engage in a
philosophical discussion. So too does Plato’s Menexenus invite its reader to
respond critically and engage the issues philosophically. Thus, both Plato
and Socrates attempt to motivate a philosophical examination into the
nature of virtue.

vii. conclusion
The three interpretive diﬃculties I mention at the beginning can be resolved
by understanding the rhetoric of parody in the Menexenus. First, I show that
the parody in the Menexenus has serious philosophical implications, which
are both critical and constructive. My interpretation of the Menexenus
preserves its unity in that it accounts for both comic device and serious
philosophical content, without splitting the dialogue up into a sequence of
comic and serious parts. Second, I show that the parody has multiple and
overlapping targets, including but not limited to Pericles’ funeral oration,
and that the Aspasia reference need not have univocal signiﬁcance. Finally,
I show that the anachronism is a consequence of the parodic strategy of
ampliﬁcation to absurdity and that it is meant to draw our attention to the
historical inaccuracies of the speech.
This approach to the dialogue not only provides a uniﬁed interpretation
of the dialogue that gives philosophical content to Plato’s use of parody but
also potentially oﬀers a more general model for understanding the parody
in other dialogues. As Plato employs it in the Menexenus, parody takes a
critical standpoint against its target, but it does not annihilate or subvert the
target entirely. Rather, the criticisms aim at particular determinate features.
In fact, Plato situates his particular criticisms in terms of implied counterideals, which the genre and its exemplars fail to live up to. Furthermore, the
target genre reﬂects the intentions and possibilities of the philosophical
genre as well. Plato’s parodic criticism functions as a kind of inverse mirror
for the genre of philosophy. By identifying the speciﬁc features of a genre or
text that Plato singles out for his parodic criticism, we can attempt to locate
his ambitions for his own dialogues. The parody in the Menexenus shows
that Plato attempts to care for his audience: through criticism, he hopes to
encourage them to pursue self-knowledge, to seek the truth, and to strive to
be as virtuous as possible.
Marquette University
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notes
1. Clavaud’s survey of the literature divides the modern scholarship into “les partisans
du sérieux” (1980, 45–48), “les conciliateurs” (1980, 48–66), and “les partisans du comique”
(1980, 66–74).
2. Kahn argues that the Mx. is a “kind of political pamphlet” (1963, 229), which “praises
Athens as she should be praised” (1963, 224) and makes an appeal for Panhellenic unity
(1963, 230). Ancient writers tended to take the oration seriously as well: see Dionysius of
Halicarnassus (Dem. 23–30). Cicero apparently claimed that Plato’s oration was read annually in Athens (Orator 151). Kahn takes this as evidence of the seriousness of the funeral
oration. However, even if we grant that “there is no reason to doubt” Cicero regarding the
yearly recitation (Kahn 1963, 229), it is not obvious what exactly Cicero means here. Since
the context is a discussion of the avoidance of hiatus, it is not clear to whom the speech was
delivered every year. If, for example, it was read in the Academy, then there is no reason
to think it serious in Kahn’s sense. Further, the sentence itself has been suspected as the
interpolation of an annotator who mistook the custom of delivering the speech annually
for an annual recitation of the Mx.: see Sandys 1885, 162–63. Huby (1957, 105–6) attempts,
unsuccessfully in my view, to discredit this argument. Given my misgivings, contra Kahn,
I do not take the annual recitation as one of the dialogue’s main puzzles.
3. Even Clavaud’s “conciliateurs” only manage to acknowledge both comic and serious
elements by splitting the dialogue and the funeral oration into serious parts and comic
parts (1980, 48).
4. Aeschines, a minor Socratic, wrote a dialogue called “Aspasia”: see Clavaud
1980, 253–58. On Antiphon as a target, see Clavaud 1980, 263–77. On Lysias as a target,
see Henderson 1975.
5. A fourth diﬃculty might have been added, but the authenticity of the dialogue,
once in doubt, is no longer questioned: see Aristotle Rhet. 1376b8, 1415b30.
6. Long (2003, 50) seems to think that the recognition of the comic elements in
the dialogue amounts to a disavowal of the need for a uniﬁed interpretation of Mx. This
inference is hardly justiﬁed—what follows is rather that a uniﬁed interpretation must take
the comic elements into account.
7. The last claim is most crucial. Instead of dividing the dialogue into serious and
comic parts, I propose to understand the serious point of the comedy. Cf. Salkever 1993,
133–34. On the conceptual confusion often attending the failure to understand comedy as
serious, see Silk (2000, 310–20), who has an extremely instructive discussion of the meaning of the word serious and the various equivocations that are prevalent in discussions
of the seriousness of Aristophanic comedy. To summarize his position, serious has three
senses: (1) “solemn” as opposed to “humorous,” (2) “honest” as opposed to “pretending,” and
(3) “substantial” as opposed to “trivial.” Comedy and tragedy can be serious in the third
sense, even if only one is serious in the ﬁrst.
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8. This characterization is intentionally broad. It has been historically diﬃcult to pin
down what exactly counts as a case of parody: see Rose 1993. Even in antiquity, the word
par%di/a had multiple senses: see Householder 1944.
9. Henderson claims that the presence of multiple parodic targets makes the Mx. a
“pastiche” (1975, 33). Since a pastiche can be merely imitative or parodic, I retain parody for
clarity’s sake.
10. For other sorts of parodic distortion, see Rose 1993, 37–38. My analysis of the Frogs
passage relies on Silk 1993.
11. There are several kinds of parodic inversion. For example, the literal understanding
of an abstract concept is a kind of parodic inversion employed quite liberally in Aristophanes’ Clouds.
12. All translations are my own. For the Mx., I have consulted Paul Ryan’s translation
in Cooper 1997.
13. Silk (1993, 482, 486–87) notes that the ornate compound adjectives, simplex verbs,
Doric alphas, verse vocabulary, and suppression of articles in this passage are literary
features typical of tragic lyric that are not speciﬁc to Euripidean tragedy.
14. Cf. the following excerpts from Euripidean monody: da/krusi da/krusin, wÅ do/moj
wÅ do/moj (Pho. 1500); eãrin eãrin ta/lainan eãqeto (Hel. 248); oÁj eãteken eãteken (Or. 987). In
the Phrygian slave’s long frantic monody in Orestes (1369–1502), there are no fewer than
eighteen such repetitions.
15. Some scholars see Aristophanes’ comedy as mere entertainment with no serious
political intention: see, e.g., Heath 1987. For a clearheaded diagnosis and criticism of the
tendency of modern scholars to impose an artiﬁcial separation between art and politics in
Aristophanes, see Henderson 1996, 65–69.
16. The debate in the literature on the Mx. has been marred by the thought that
the comic and the serious must be mutually exclusive. Kahn exempliﬁes the speciousness
of such reasoning: he argues that the speech cannot be parodic or satirical because “the
intended eﬀect is not primarily comical” (1963, 226). On his account (1963, 229ﬀ.), the dialogue aims at a serious attack on Athenian imperialism and an appeal for Panhellenic unity.
To rephrase his argument: “If the Menexenus is serious, it cannot be parody; it is serious;
therefore it cannot be parody.”
17. Nightingale (1995) seems to think that parody, or at least Plato’s use of parody,
involves a full repudiation of the targeted object. I will show that she is wrong about Plato
and, a fortiori, about the larger claim. I do not want to deny that parody can involve a full
repudiation. In fact, I think one only ﬁnds it in the rarest of cases. Most cases, I submit, are
what I call “complex.” Rose (1993, 45–47) shows how theories of the attitude of the parodist
tend toward a false choice between the extremes of contempt and sympathy despite the fact
that parodies often are both critical of and sympathetic to their targets.
18. This is signaled by making the cause of the tragic fuss turn out to be a chicken.
Euripides himself had earlier exclaimed, “One ought not write about a chicken in tragedy”
(Frogs 935).
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19. In Aristophanes’ Acharnians, Euripides is mocked precisely for putting beggars
and cripples, i.e., “low” people, on the stage (384ﬀ.).
20. Another way to put this same point would be that parodic criticism can operate
dialectically (in the Hegelian sense): such parody criticizes but does not jettison its target.
If parody is dialectical, then the target genre or text is partly preserved in the “higher unity”
of the parodying text. By using the Hegelian notion of Aufhebung, or determinate negation, as a paradigm for understanding the “negative” aspect of parody, we avoid an overly
simplistic account of parody and avoid the unfortunate dilemma between understanding
the negation as either annihilating or merely playful, i.e., as born out of either contempt
for or sympathy with the target. See Hegel’s Science of Logic (I.1.1.C.3 [106–8]).
21. Henderson (1996, 66n2) describes the didactic function of tragedy as an “assumption” of the Frogs. He also claims that the Frogs conceives of “tragic poets as exemplifying
and shaping the moral and civic character of their times” (2002, 5).
22. Cf. Arist. Poet. chap. 15. The protagonist should be “good” (Poet. 1454a17) but not
“preeminent in virtue” (Poet. 1453a8).
23. Indeed, in the Grg., Socrates describes most rhetoric as a species of ﬂattery, of
which epitaphios emerges here as a particularly egregious example.
24. In detailing the eﬀects of the speech on him, Socrates invokes motifs found
commonly in Aristophanic comedy’s portrayal of the eﬀect of praise on the Athenians
both in the Assembly and the law courts. See, e.g., Ach. 1–204, 626–718. Loraux claims
that “there is not a single element [of this playful praise] that Plato does not borrow
from” Aristophanes’ Wasps: the exhaustive character of self-celebratory speeches (1986,
636–37), the illusions of grandeur felt by the audience (1986, 637–38), the euphoric eﬀect
caused by eloquence (1986, 641), and the imaginary voyage to the Islands of the Blessed
(1986, 639–40). Loraux goes characteristically too far in saying that Plato “plagiarized”
Aristophanes (1986, 311).
25. Cf. Lysias 2.1. Ziolkowski (1981, 68–70), in his excellent work on the structure of
the funeral oration, claims that mentioning the diﬃculty of the task was a common way
that funeral orators tried to gain the sympathy of their audience. Plato notably omits this
commonplace. Kahn (1963, 231) sees Socrates’ comments here as indicating that the Lysias
oration is also one of the parody’s targets. Henderson denies this, though he (1975, 30–33)
does argue that Lysias is a target of the parody for other reasons.
26. See, e.g., Ar. Ach. 520–30.
27. On the derogatory sense of sugkolla/w and its comic origin, see Loraux 1986,
469n282.
28. See Henderson 1975, 28. On the signiﬁcance of Aspasia being a woman, see Loraux
1986; Salkever 1993.
29. Aristophanes uses this strategy of attributing well-known Periclean actions to
Aspasia in Ach., where Pericles is made to have started the Peloponnesian War essentially
because of Aspasia.
30. Menexenus remains skeptical of Aspasia’s role even after the speech (249d–e).
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31. This anecdotal evidence is dubious at best, but Thucydides does call Antiphon
“one of the ablest Athenians of his time” who had a “powerful intellect” and gave “the best
and most helpful advice,” and he judges Antiphon’s defense speech to be “the best one
ever made up to [his] time” (8.68). On the stylistic similarities between Thucydides and
Antiphon, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De compositione verborum 10, 22. See also Lamb
1914, 178–83.
32. To refer to Spartans, Thucydides uses “Peloponnesians” (257 times) far more
often than other authors, though he uses “Lacadaimonians” (630) even more frequently.
Cf. Xenophon and Isocrates, who both use “Peloponnesians” (twenty and seventeen
times, respectively) infrequently and “Lacadaimonians” (484, 168) frequently. Plato uses
“Peloponnesians” three times in the Lg. but nowhere else. In his oration, Socrates refers to
the Lacadaimonians nine times and never to Peloponnesians. These statistics are from a
search of TLG-E. See Monoson 1998, 491–92.
33. He takes on the role of Strepsiades, the slow and aged student in Aristophanes’
Clouds. On the “late learner,” see Diggle 2004, 477. Cf. Theophr. Char. 27. On the late
learner in Plato, see Tarrant 1996. Cf. Sph. 251b; Rep. 409b.
34. My thanks go to Stephanie Nelson for pointing this out to me. On the chorus’
practice of stripping, see Sommerstein 1980, 188. Cf. Ach. 627; V. 408; Pax 729–30; Lys. 615,
637; Thesm. 656.
35. The solemn tone of the parodic funeral oration should not be wholly surprising,
since the parody must substantially reproduce the tone of its target. That said, parody often
does have a mocking or playful tone, which this one surely lacks.
36. The other extant orations are Lysias 2, Demosthenes 60, Hyperides 6, and a fragment from Gorgias (preserved in Dionysius of Halicarnassus Dem. 1).
37. The connection was recognized also in antiquity by Dionysius of Halicarnassus
(Dem. 23).
38. For other alleged parallels, see Monoson 1998, 492–95.
39. See also Wickkiser 1999, 66–67.
40. The use of antithesis became widespread among Greek writers and orators, but
its popularization is typically attributed to Gorgias. On the Gorgianic style of Socrates’
oration, see Coventry 1989, 7; Kahn 1963, 230; Wickkiser 1999, 67. On Thucydides’ use of
antithesis, see Lamb 1914, 183–89; Parry 1970. On the inﬂuence of Gorgias on Thucydides,
see Lamb 1914, 149–63.
41. The word order, reproduced in my translation, sets “beautifully spoken words” in
between “deeds bravely done” and “remembrance and honor,” thus emphasizing the mediating role of words in honoring deeds. See Wickkiser 1999, 67.
42. By itself, the endorsement of the tradition would not recall Pericles, since such
approval was a common feature of the prologue: see Ziolkowski 1981, 68–72. The seemingly
conventional nature of Socrates’ opening should not mislead us. We know from the beginning of the dialogue that he cannot possibly mean what he says here. See Clavaud 1980,
110; Coventry 1989, 5.
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43. Cf. Lysias 2.18–19; Demosthenes 60.25–26.
44. On the connotations of the word demokratia in the ﬁfth and fourth centuries,
see Sealey 1987. He argues that the Thuc. passage cited above shows the “deprecatory force”
of the word (1987, 101–2), which Pericles wants to disclaim. On Pericles’ meaning in this
passage, see also Gomme 1956, 107–9.
45. In conjunction with Ap. 22a2–6, this point gains more force. In describing his
search for a wise man, Socrates claims to have found that “those with the highest reputation were nearly the most deﬁcient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more
capable with respect to knowledge.”
46. As is clear from the Grg., Plato took a dim view of Pericles’ political stewardship
(515dﬀ.).
47. In discussing this section, Kahn (1963, 225–26) argues that, since there is a serious
protreptic intention, the passage cannot be parody. This is clearly fallacious, as my own
interpretation will show that the parody does have protreptic intentions. Kahn glosses over
the emphasis on seeming noted above and insists that the passage is an instance of “tendentious protreptic” (1963, 226), though exactly what he means by this remains obscure.
48. I will omit discussion of the autochthony section in this article. On autochthony
as a commonplace of the genre, see Ziolkowski 1981, 120–21. On Athens as freedom ﬁghters as a commonplace of the funeral oration, see Ziolkowski 1981, 106–8. For Athens as
philanthropic in general, see Ziolkowski 1981, 102–10. In Lysias’s long historical section
(2.3–66), he really emphasizes the notion of the Athenians as freedom ﬁghters, and he
is likely a target of Plato’s in this section: see Henderson 1975, 30–31, esp. 30n22. On the
importance of the Persian War for Athenian orators, see Pownall 2004, 40–42.
49. For various accountings of the particular inaccuracies, see Clavaud 1980, 127–67;
Henderson 1975, 39–45; Pownall 2004, 49–58; Shawyer 1906, xi–xv.
50. Because of these misrepresentations, epitaphioi are not considered reliable sources
for fourth-century history. Since the orators were not historians, they were not bound by,
e.g., the historical methodology that Thucydides lays out for himself (1.20ﬀ.). Worthington
claims that, regarding historical information, “the orators lie, distort, deliberately deceive,
suppress the truth, and prevaricate as a matter of course. . . . [F]acts, persons and events
were exploited, manipulated and even, if necessary, created to persuade the audience”
(1994, 109). So I am in full agreement with Kahn’s (1963, 224–25) caution against taking every historical inaccuracy as evidence of parodic distortion. See also Pownall
2004, 49–50.
51. Henderson describes the cumulative eﬀect thus: “The other orators may be wrong
on details—even hopelessly so—but Plato excels all. . . . [N]one can rival him either in the
number or degree of errors, omissions and distortions. Plato insists upon the righteousness of the Athenians in the past, willfully distorting history to prove his point. Whatever
stands in the way of this rosy picture is ruthlessly discarded” (1975, 40). Kahn calls it a
“systematic distortion of Athenian history” (1963, 220).
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52. I agree with Coventry that it is implausible to view this section as a “noble lie”
(1989, 9n33).
53. Coventry claims that the descriptions of Persia “could apply equally well to the
Athenian empire” and that this parallel is being drawn intentionally as a subtle way of
undercutting the omission of Athens’ empire (1989, 9–10). See also Pownall 2004, 55.
54. To take the last case for example, though it is true that the Leontini was an
Athenian ally, who appealed to Athens for assistance against Syracuse, and that the issue
of Leontini comes up several times in Thuc. (3.86, 5.4, 6.6), Thucydides himself clearly
regards the motive of sending help to allies like Leontini as merely a pretext and the true
aim of the Sicilian expedition to be control over the entire island of Sicily (6.6).
55. That Athens had an empire, properly speaking, is not considered controversial: for
a classic exposition, see, e.g., Meiggs 1972. The character of that empire is a matter of some
dispute. I am inclined to agreement with scholars who clearly face up to the ugly side of
the Athenian Empire. See, e.g., Samons 2004. Thucydides himself sometimes paints an
appalling picture of Athens as an imperial power (e.g., 5.84–115) but sometimes seems
to glorify it: on this, see de Ste Croix 1954. For a summary of views concerning Pericles’
responsibility for the imperial character of Athens, see Rhodes 2007.
56. Cf. Lysias 2.47, 55.
57. On this point, see Henderson 1975, 42–43, 42n72.
58. Lysias also makes disunity an explanation for defeat (2.65–66).
59. For example, he blames the Sicilian disaster on the length of the voyage, which
prevented Athens from sending reinforcements. Never mind that they sent reinforcements
twice—on Socrates’ account, because of the distance, they “gave in and were unlucky”
(243a). See Thuc. 7.16, 7.42. On bad luck as a theme, see Henderson 1975, 42–43.
60. Contrast Lysias, who more elegantly acknowledges and slips past military defeat
in his oration (2.58–59).
61. Both Kahn (1963, 227) and Rosenstock (1994, 338) overstate the importance of
the anachronism, conceiving of it as the key to understanding the whole dialogue. I see
no reason to generalize Plato’s use of this anachronism, as Pownall does: “Plato’s use of
anachronism in the Menexenus is similar to that of his other works, in that it functions as
a reminder to the reader to look beneath the surface of the verbal sophistries contained in
the oratorical tradition for the underlying moral truth” (2004, 59).
62. Kahn claims that in this passage, one ﬁnds “the real meaning of the speech” (1963,
226) and that it is a “truly Platonic funeral oration” (1963, 229).
63. The signiﬁcance of this tone shift is typically assumed without argument, following Kahn 1963, 229.
64. See Ziolkowski 1981, 138–40. Beginning with Kahn, commentators have also
claimed to notice a “bitter” tone in the Mx. Kahn (1963, 229–30) thinks that the narrative
of the Corinthian War is the most bitter part of the speech but that the overall eﬀect is
bitter as well. Coventry (1989, 14–15) ﬁnds the exhortation to be particularly bitter but, like
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Kahn, thinks the speech as a whole is bitter. Monoson (1998, 502) also notices a stinging
tone, though decidedly not in the exhortation. I cannot see how either the exhortation or
the praise section can be reasonably described as bitter, unless one is attributing complex
parodic intentions to Plato. On the surface, no bitterness is apparent. As no textual evidence is ever given to substantiate the “bitterness” claim, I will not endeavor to prove the
negative.
65. Coventry also argues that the conception of virtue in Mx. is not genuinely Socratic,
but too much of her argument relies on Ap., and she does not provide a substantial analysis
of the model of virtue provided in Mx. except to claim that it is deﬁcient “in its intellectual
level” (1989, 14–15).
66. It is present in every section: see Ziolkowski 1981. In his oration, Pericles mentions
aretē twelve times; in the Platonic parody, there are fourteen instances; and in the funeral
oration of Lysias, it occurs thirty-four times.
67. Thus, Coventry (1989, 14) is in error when she claims that the protreptic of the Mx.
is addressed only to children, as opposed to genuinely Socratic protreptic, which, following
Ap. 30a, is addressed to both young and old. Addressing the children and the parents of the
dead was typical of this section: see Ziolkowski 1981, 154–16.
68. Cf. Lysias 2.77; Thuc. 2.44; Hyp. 6.42.
69. Coventry calls the moral sentiments expressed in the exhortation “bland conventional moralizing” (1989, 14); however, she does not fully appreciate the military inﬂection
that Socrates has given to virtue.
70. On this point, see Samons 2004, 187.
71. Though Pericles does advise a cessation to the expansion of the empire in order
to win the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.65), given what he says in the funeral oration
about imperial expansion as the measure of a generation’s success (2.36), it seems clear
that Pericles envisioned his strategy as a temporary measure to be jettisoned after the war
was won.
72. None of this implies that courage is not a virtue or that citizens should refuse to
serve when called upon by their city. Socrates’ own hoplite service, particularly in the retreat
from Delium, seems to have been distinguished: see Ap. 28e; La. 181b; Symp. 219e–221b.
73. Indeed, those who want to make the exhortation genuinely Platonic tend to make
just this mistake, often by insisting that this part of the speech is diﬀerent (in tone, intention, etc.) and can therefore be understood in isolation from the rest. Kahn, for example,
refers to the “mixed tone” of the entire work (1963, 229).
74. Coventry describes Socrates’ elenchus as “more painful and more intellectually
demanding” (1989, 14).
75. Other scholars have noticed the protreptic intention here but have insuﬃciently
appreciated the role of the parody in executing it: see Coventry 1989, 2; Kahn 1963, 225–26.
76. Monoson claims that, in this passage, Mx. “appears to make sincere use of this
form of discourse and this public occasion”; she relies on the change in tone argument
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(see note 73 above) and claims that, from 246a forward, one ﬁnds “more straightforward
and apparently heartfelt argument” (1998, 502). I think Monoson is right to think that
Pericles’ oration is one of the targets here, though perhaps not for the reasons she thinks.
Among our extant funeral orations, only Pericles’ elaborates on the relationship between
city and citizen to the same degree (Thuc. 2.43). Thus, it is plausible that Plato has that
section in mind. Attention to the greatness of Athens, Pericles argues, should make the
citizens lovers (e)rasta\j) of Athens and its power (Thuc. 2.43.1). This erotic model of citizenship is tied to a militaristic conception of virtue. Monoson (1998, 495–97), in my view,
relies too heavily on Plato’s Lysis to make her case. She (1998, 511n27) mentions but does not
emphasize the stronger evidence of the politician as lover in the Grg. Recall that Callicles
is described as having two lovers, both of whom are called “Demos” (Grg. 482c–e).
77. See especially the Grg., in which nearly the entire discussion with Polus and Callicles
is dedicated to the defense of the preferability of suﬀering to committing injustice.
78. Though I do not agree with Huby’s (1957) argument that the Mx. is intended as a
political pamphlet on behalf of war orphans, if she is right that Athens was neglecting, or
considering neglecting, her duties in taking care of the families of the war dead, then the
parodic point here gains more force.
79. There is some dispute as to whether the text indicates that the whole of the tribute
or the surplus of the tribute was carried onstage: see Raubitschek 1941, 359–60. For the
relation of the festival as a whole to Athenian political ideology, see Goldhill 1987.
80. For evidence regarding the frequency of the public funeral ceremony,
see Ziolkowski 1981, 22–23. Socrates mentions athletic and poetic contests in addition.
Though I will not pursue the point here, the purpose of these contests, in this context, was
arguably to promote military readiness and to celebrate military deeds, respectively.
81. See also Loraux 1974, 173–77; Nightingale 1995. Ziolkowski (1981, 132–37) identiﬁes
thirty-nine commonplaces of praise in the funeral oration.
82. Pericles, in a diﬀerent speech, describes the Athenian Empire as a “tyranny” but
quickly brushes aside any moral misgivings (Thuc. 2.63). He asserts that Athens will be
remembered eternally for the greatness of her power: for “having spent more lives and
work on warfare than any other city” and for “having ruled over more Greeks than anyone
else” (2.64).
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